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competing risks with nonparametric Frailty
Marco Pollo Almeida, Rafael Paixa˜o, Pedro Ramos, Vera Tomazella, Francisco Louzada and Ricardo Ehlers
Abstract—The aim of this article is to analyze data from
multiple repairable systems under the presence of dependent
competing risks. In order to model this dependence structure,
we adopted the well-known shared frailty model. This model
provides a suitable theoretical basis for generating dependence
between the components failure times in the dependent competing
risks model. It is known that the dependence effect in this
scenario influences the estimates of the model parameters. Hence,
under the assumption that the cause-specific intensities follow
a PLP, we propose a frailty-induced dependence approach to
incorporate the dependence among the cause-specific recurrent
processes. Moreover, the misspecification of the frailty distri-
bution may lead to errors when estimating the parameters of
interest. Because of this, we considered a Bayesian nonparametric
approach to model the frailty density in order to offer more
flexibility and to provide consistent estimates for the PLP model,
as well as insights about heterogeneity among the systems. Both
simulation studies and real case studies are provided to illustrate
the proposed approaches and demonstrate their validity.
Index Terms—Shared frailty, Bayesian non-parametric, re-
pairable systems, power law process, dependent competing risks,
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronyms
PLP Power law process.
HPP Homogeneous Poisson process.
NHPP Nonhomogeneous Poisson process.
DPM Dirichlet process mixture.
HMC Hamiltonian Monte Carlo.
NOTATION
βˆBayesj Bayes Estimator of βj .
αˆBayesj Bayes Estimator of αj .
λ(·) Intensity function.
N(·) Univariate counting process.
α and β PLP parameters.
Λ(·) Mean function.
Z Frailty variable.
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STUDYING recurrent event data is important in many areassuch as engineering, social and political sciences and in
the public health setting. In all these fields of study, the event
of interest occurs on a recurring basis. For example, failure
of a mechanical or electrical component may occur more than
once; the recurrence of bugs over time in a software system
that is under development; successive tumors in cancer studies;
myocardial infarction and epileptic seizure in patients, to name
but a few.
In particular, in reliability analysis, interest is usually cen-
tered on failure data from complex repairable systems [1].
Monitoring the status of a repairable system leads to a recur-
rent events framework, where events correspond to failures of a
system. A system is defined as repairable when it receives any
corrective measure (other than replacing the whole system) in
order to restore its components when they have failed and can
be returned to the satisfactory operation state where it is able to
perform all its functions. On the other hand, a nonrepairable
system is a system that is discarded when the first failure
occurs [2]. However, we will just focus on repairable system
case.
The primary challenge when modeling repairable systems
data is how to account for the effect of a repair action
performed immediately after a failure. In general, one assumes
that repair actions are instantaneous and repair time is neg-
ligible. The most explored assumptions are either minimal
repair and perfect repair. In the former, it is supposed that
the repair action, after a failure, returns the system to the
exact condition it was immediately before it failed. In the
latter, the repair action leaves the system as if it were new. In
the engineering literature, these types of repair or corrective
maintenance are usually called: ABAO and AGAN [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7]. More sophisticated models which account for repair
action that leave the system somewhere between the ABAO
and AGAN conditions are possible, although they will not be
considered here; see for instance, [8].
Statistical modeling of the occurrence of failures is done
using point processes, particularly, as we will see later, count-
ing processes. In this framework, the model is completely
characterized by its failure intensity function. The failure
history of a repairable system, under a minimal repair strategy,
is usually modeled according to a NHPP. In the repairable
system literature, one of the most important and well-known
parametric forms for the NHPP model is the PLP. The PLP
process is convenient because it is easy to implement, it is
flexible and the parameters have good interpretations. Regard-
ing classical inference for the PLP, see, for instance, [1] or
[2]. Bayesian inference has been considered among others by
[9], [10], [11] and [12].
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Additionally, in this work, we emphasize an alternative
specification of the PLP, which is obtained by using a simple
operational definition of its parameters, making them orthog-
onal to each other. This formulation is considered by [13]
motivated by ideas from [10] and [14]. The former authors
show that this reparametrization leads to some advantageous
results such as orthogonality among parameters, the likelihood
function becomes proportional to a product of gamma densities
and the expected Fisher information matrix is diagonal. The
model we discuss here is based on such reparametrization
because it results in mathematical and computational simpli-
fications for our research.
In reliability theory, the most common system configura-
tions are series systems, parallel systems, and series-parallel
systems. In a series system, components are connected in
series, in such a way that the failure of a single compo-
nent results in system failure. The same setting may be
expressed in an alternative way by a repairable system in
which components can perform different operations, and thus
be subject to different types of failures. Traditionally, models
with this characteristic are known as competing risks. In
complex systems, such as supercomputers, aircraft generators,
industrial plants, jet engines, and cars, the presence of multiple
types (or causes) of failure is common. From an economic
perspective, such systems are commonly repaired rather than
replacing the system with a new one after failure. Thus, this
model can also be called a repairable competing risks system.
As we pointed out already, commonly used methodologies
for analyzing multi-type recurrent event data are based on
multivariate counting processes and cause-specific intensity
functions [15], [16].
It is worth noticing that the existing literature on competing
risks in reliability is extensive and focuses particularly on
analysis for nonrepairable systems, e.g., [17], [18], [19] to cite
a few. On the other hand, a number of authors have considered
modeling competing risks in a repairable systems framework.
For example, some authors have mainly been interested in
questions concerning maintenance analysis [20], [21], [8].
Others have highlighted the relevance of failure analysis of
the components of the system based on cause-specific intensity
function, such as [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27].
In the field of reliability engineering, much of the cur-
rent literature on competing risks pays particular attention
to the hypothesis that the components’ (causes) failures are
independent from each other [22], [28], [29], [25]. However,
this assumption is restrictive in some real situations because
there are many ways of dependence between components. We
can call this case dependent competing risks. Moreover, it
is important to point out that neglecting existing dependence
can lead to estimation errors and bad predictions of system
behavior [30]. A seminal study in this area is the work of
[31]. [32] and [33] give an extensive discussion on copula
theory in order to model the dependence between components
(competing failure modes) in particular settings. [30] discuss
an optimal maintenance planning for dependent competing
risks systems. [34] mentions a particular situation where
the components within a system are physically, logically, or
functionally connected, as an example of dependent failure
causes. It means that the condition of a component influences
or induces the failure of other components and vice-versa.
This author works with the dependence framework based
on a gamma frailty model. An interesting perspective has
been explored by [35], who argue that dependence can be
induced by the environment the system is subjected to, i.e.,
the situation where the components of the system (or cluster)
share the same environmental stress. Along the same lines,
[24] assert that in a repairable systems context such clustering
arises naturally across the recurrent failures of a system. The
approach proposed by [24] for modeling dependence is also
based on frailty.
These examples demonstrate the importance of the theme
and, therefore, the need to develop new analysis method-
ologies. However, very few articles address the dependence,
particularly in the setting of recurrent competing risks in
repairable systems with PLP. Based on these reasons, we
propose a shared frailty [36], [37] model using a (multi-
variate) counting process framework whose intensity function
is that of reparametrized PLP. Specifically, the intensity is
multiplied by a frailty (or random effect) term, which follows
a suitable distribution for a positive random variable. This
model provides a suitable theoretical basis for generating
dependence between the components failure times. In other
words, the components belonging to a cluster (or system)
share a common factor (frailty term), which generates such
dependence. The assignment of a probability distribution to
frailty plays an important role in the analysis of models with
random effects. However, in order to avoid making incorrect
model specifications when there is uncertainty about some
inherent characteristics of a distribution (e.g., multimodality,
skewness, and heavy tails) [38], we propose a nonparametric
approach to model the frailty density (density estimation) [39],
[40], [41]. Our approach to these problems is fully Bayesian
and based on both MCMC methods (for frailty) and closed-
form Bayesian estimators (for PLP parameters) for estimation.
The main contributions of the proposed research include: (i)
Our modeling of the dependence effect on multi-component
systems, based on multivariate recurrent processes and the
shared frailty model, is advantageous because we can perform
an individual posterior analysis of the quantities of interest,
i.e., we estimate the interest parameters of the PLP (our main
focus) separately from nuisance parameter of frailty distri-
bution (variance). Regarding PLP parameters, we consider
noninformative priors so that the posterior distributions are
proper. With respect to frailty, our proposal avoids making
incorrect specifications of the frailty distribution when there
is uncertainty about some inherent characteristics of distribu-
tion. In this case, we use nonparametric Bayesian inference.
Besides, a particular novelty is our hybrid MCMC algorithm
for computing the posterior estimates with respect to the frailty
distribution, see [27].
In this paper, the main objective is to study certain aspects
of modeling failure time data of repairable systems under
a competing risks framework. We propose more efficient
Bayesian methods for estimating the model parameters. Thus,
we can list some specific objectives:
• to consider an orthogonal parametrization for the PLP
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model parameters such that the likelihood function be-
comes proportional to a product of gamma densities and
the expected Fisher information matrix is diagonal;
• to propose a frailty-induced dependence approach to
incorporate the dependence among the cause-specific
recurrent processes. Besides, to consider a nonparametric
approach to model the frailty density using a DPM
prior. Additionally, to propose a hybrid MCMC sampler
algorithm composed by HMC and Gibbs sampling to
compute the posterior estimates with respect to the frailty
distribution. Regarding PLP parameters, to propose a
class of noninformative priors whose resulting poste-
rior distributions are proper and to obtain closed-form
Bayesian estimators.
The remaining part of the paper proceed as follows: In
Section II, fundamental groundwork in terms of repairable
systems, dependent competing risks and shared frailty model is
presented. Section III, presents the modeling of the problem
in a point of view of multiple repairable systems under de-
pendent causes of failure. The Bayesian analysis is developed
in Section IV, with a discussion on the choice of priors
distributions for the proposed model and the computation of
posterior distributions. In Section V, an extensive simulation
study is described in order to evaluate the efficiency of the
proposed Bayesian estimators, and Section VI uses them to
analyse a real data set that comprises the failure history for a
fleet of cars under warranty. Section VII concludes the paper
with final remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Multiple repairable systems
In this section, we present a brief overview to analyze data
from multiple repairable systems, but we refer the reader to
[2] and [13] for details and proofs. Here, we highlight just two
important assumptions in this context. The first is to assume
that all systems are identical or different. The second is to
assume that all systems have the same truncation time τ or,
otherwise, have different truncations at τj . However, for the
sake of simplicity and brevity of exposition, we assumed the
observation lengths, τ , for each system to be equal. Moreover,
in this paper, we assume all systems to be identical, i.e., the
systems are specified as m independent realizations of the
same process, with intensity function λ.
If the multivariate counting processes N1(t), . . . , Nm(t) are
all observed at the same time τ , the NHPP resulting from
the superposition of NHPPs is given by N(t) =
∑m
j=1Nj(t)
and has an intensity function given by λ(t) = mλ(t); e.g.,
overlapping realizations of a PLP. Therefore, inferences in
models proposed for this framework can be made through the
following likelihood function
L(λ) =
 m∏
j=1
nj∏
i=1
λ(tji)
 exp
− m∑
j=1
∫ τ
0
λ(s)ds
 .
B. Unobserved heterogeneity between multiple systems
The m systems are considered to be identical, and there-
fore have the same intensity function and thus we would
have a random sample of systems. On the other hand, this
assumption may not be true. That is, in many real-world reli-
ability applications there may be some heterogeneity between
”apparently identical” repairable systems. In this case, it is
necessary to propose a statistical model capable of capturing
this heterogeneity. [42], [43], [44] and [45] discuss frailty
models for modeling and analyzing repairable systems data
with unobserved heterogeneity.
C. The minimal repair model
Before turning to formal definitions, we provide an intuitive
and real example. We said earlier that a minimal repair policy
is enough to make the system operational again. For example,
if the water pump fails on a car, the minimal repair consists
only of repairing or replacing the water pump. As we said
before, the purpose is to bring the car (system) back to
operation as soon as possible. From an economic perspective,
complex systems are commonly repaired rather than replacing
the system with a new one after failure.
Recalling that NHPP is completely specified by its intensity
function, then when parametric models are adopted for the
intensity function of an NHPP, we are interested in making
inferences about the parameters of this function. In addition,
one knows that the NHPP forms a class of models that
naturally applies to a minimal repair, i.e., the repair brings
the system back into the same state it was in just prior to the
failure. One of the most important and used functional forms
is the PLP.
The parametric form for the PLP intensity is given by
λ(t) = (β/µ)(t/µ)β−1, (1)
where µ, β > 0. Its mean function is
Λ(t) = E[N(t)] =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds = (t/µ)β . (2)
The scale parameter µ is the time for which we expect to
observe a single event, while β is the elasticity of the mean
number of events with respect to time [13].
Since (1) increases (decreases) in t for β > 1 (β < 1),
the PLP can accommodate both systems that deteriorate or
improve over time. Of course, when β = 1, the intensity (1)
is constant and hence the PLP becomes an HPP.
Under minimal repair, the failure history of a repairable
system is modeled as an NHPP. As mentioned above, the PLP
(1) provides a flexible parametric form for the intensity of the
process. Under the time truncation design, i.e. when failure
data is collected up to time T , the likelihood becomes
L(β, µ | n, t) = β
n
µnβ
(
n∏
i=1
ti
)β−1
exp
[
−
(
T
µ
)β]
, (3)
where we assume that n ≥ 1 failures at times t1 < t2 < . . . <
tn < T were observed, i = 1, . . . , n [2]. The MLEs of the
parameters are given by
βˆ = n/
n∑
i=1
log(T/ti) and µˆ = T/n1/βˆ . (4)
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D. Reparametrized PLP
[13] suggest reparametrizing the model (1) in terms of β
and α, where the latter is given by
α = E[N(T )] = (T/µ)β , (5)
so that the likelihood (3) becomes
L(β, α|n, t) = c
(
βne−nβ/βˆ
) (
αne−α
)
∝ γ(β|n+ 1, n/βˆ)γ(α|n+ 1, 1) ,
(6)
where c =
∏n
i=1 t
−1
i , βˆ = n/
∑n
i=1 log(T/ti) is the MLE
of β and γ(x|a, b) = baxa−1e−bx/Γ(a) is the PDF of
the gamma distribution with shape and scale parameters a
and b, respectively. It is important to point out that β and
α are orthogonal parameters. For the advantages of having
orthogonal parameters, see [46].
E. Competing risks
In reliability theory, the most common system configu-
rations are the series systems, parallel systems, and series-
parallel systems. In a series system, components are connected
in such a way that the failure of a single component results
in system failure. Such a system is depicted in Figure 1. A
series system is also referred to as a competing risks system
since the failure of a system can be classified as one of the
p possible risks (components) that compete for the failure of
the system. In general, the observations of a competing risks
   . . . 1 2 p 
Fig. 1. Diagram for a competing risks system (i.e., series system) with p
risks (components).
model consist of the pair (t, δ), where t ≥ 0 represents the
time of failure and δ is the indicator of the component which
failed. An example follows to illustrate the failure history data
for this kind of framework.
example: Suppose a repairable system, and let 0 < T1 <
T2 < T3 < · · · < TN(τ) < τ be the failure times of the
system observed until a pre-fixed time τ . Moreover, there are
two (p = 2) recurrent causes of failure, and at the i-th failure
time Ti, we also observe δ ∈ {1, 2}, which is the cause of the
failure related to the i-th failure (see Figure 2).
0 τ 
T1 T2 T3 TN(τ) ⋯ 
𝛿 = 2 δ = 1 δ = 1 𝛿 = 2 ⋯ 
Fig. 2. Observable quantities from failure history of a repairable competing
risks system with two recurrent causes of failure.
Basically, we could say that in most of the literature,
there are two main approaches when analyzing failure times
with competing risks: independent and dependent competing
failure modes. For reliability models under competing risks,
most research has been carried out considering statistical
independence of component failure [19], [47], [25], [48], [49].
Thus, one assumes that independent risks are equivalent to
independent causes of failure. However, in some particular
contexts (for instance, the existence of interactions between
components in complex systems), the assumption of indepen-
dent risks may lead to seriously misleading conclusions. To
overcome this issue, some important and general approaches
have been presented in the literature for modeling dependent
competing risks data [50], [30], [33].
Considering Daniel Bernoulli’s attempt in the 18th century
to separate the risk of dying due to smallpox from other causes
[51], [52], the competing risks methodology has dissemi-
nated through various fields of science such as demography,
statistics, actuarial sciences, medicine and reliability analysis.
Therefore, one knows that both the theory and application
of competing risks is too broad to cite here, but for an
overview of the basic foundations, please see [53], [17], [54].
For repairable systems failing due to competing risks, we
refer the reader to [20], [8], [25]. Particularly, this article
responds directly to the application in repairable systems under
a recurrent data structure based on stochastic processes, which
is the most natural way to describe the recurrence of multiple
event types that occur over time.
F. Recurrent competing risks model for a single repairable
system
The assumption of the repairable system under examination
is that the components can perform different operations, and
thus be subject to different types of failures. Hence, in our
model there are K causes of failure. If n failures have been ob-
served in (0, T ], then we observe the data (t1, δ1), . . . , (tn, δn),
where 0 < t1 < · · · < tn < T are the system failure times
and δ(ti) = δi = q represents the q-th associated failure cause
with i-th failure time, i = 1, . . . , n and q = 1, . . . ,K.
One can introduce a counting process {Nq(t); t ≥ 0}
whose behavior is associated with the cause-specific intensity
function
λq(t) = lim
∆t→0
P (δ(t) = q,N(t+ ∆t]−N(t) = 1 | N(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
∆t
.
(7)
Let Nq be the cumulative number of observed failures for
the q-th cause of failure and N(t) =
∑K
q=1Nq(t) be the
cumulative number of failures of the system. Thus, N(t) is
a superposition of NHPPs and its intensity function is given
by
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0
P (N(t+ ∆t]−N(t) = 1 | N(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
∆t
=
K∑
q=1
λq(t).
(8)
The cause-specific and the system cumulative intensities are,
respectively,
Λq(t) =
∫ t
0
λq(u)du and Λ(t) =
K∑
q=1
Λq(t). (9)
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Under minimal repair, the failure history of a repairable
system is modeled as an NHPP. We give special attention to
functional form for the cause-specific intensity according to
the PLP, as follow
λq(t) =
βq
ψq
(
t
ψq
)βq−1
, (10)
with t ≥ 0, ψq > 0, βq > 0 and for q = 1, . . . ,K. The
model is quite flexible because it can accommodate both decay
(βq < 1) and growth (βq > 1) in reliability. The corresponding
mean function considering time-truncated scenario (with fixed
time T ) is
E[Nq(T )] = Λq(T ) =
(
T
ψq
)βq
. (11)
If we reparametrize (10) in terms of βq and αq , where the
latter is given by
αq =
(
T
ψq
)βq
, (12)
one obtains the following advantageous likelihood function
L(θ|t, δ) =
{
n∏
i=1
K∏
q=1
[
βqαqt
βq−1
i T
−βq
]I(δi=q)}
× exp
{
K∑
q=1
αq
}
∝
K∏
q=1
γ(βq|nq + 1, nq/βˆq)
K∏
q=1
γ(αq|nq + 1, 1),
(13)
where n =
∑K
q=1 nq; nq =
∑n
i=1 I(δi = q); θ = (β, α)
with β = (β1, . . . , βK) and α = (α1, . . . , αK); βˆq =
nq/
∑nq
i=1 log(T/ti) = nq/
∑n
i=1 log(T/ti)I(δi = q).
G. Frailty model
Frailty models are generalizations of the well-known Cox
model [55], introduced by [56]. Over the past decades, most
research in frailty has emphasized the analysis of medical and
reliability data that present heterogeneity, which cannot be
adequately explained by the Cox model. To be more precise,
it can be said that, the frailty term is a random effect that
acts multiplicatively on the hazard function of the Cox model.
This random effect could represent misspecified or omitted
covariates (unknown or unmeasured effects). Thus, one can
say that such a term (frailty) is an unobservable (latent)
quantity. In addition, the frailty methodology is very effective
to account for dependency in event times that result from
unknown sources of heterogeneity. For more details on general
frailty theory, see [37], [57].
Considering recurrent event data, several approaches of
the Cox model with a frailty factor have been discussed
in the literature [58], [59]. Additional results on frailty in
the counting process context are given in [60] and [15].
In the reliability field, the frailty model is commonly used
to model heterogeneous repairable systems [42], [43]. Such
heterogeneity is generated because some units have a higher
(or lower) event rate than other units due to unobserved
or unknown effects (e.g., instability of production processes,
environmental factors, etc.). On the other hand, [24] present
a classical inference for repairable systems under dependent
competing risks where the frailty is considered to model the
dependence between the components arranged in series.
The many approaches differ in the modeling of the base-
line hazard or in the distribution of the frailty. There is a
vast amount of published studies describing fully parametric
approaches. Regarding the probability distribution that should
be assigned to the frailty term (random effect), in general,
it follows a distribution appropriate for a positive random
variable. Parametric frailty models are standard in the literature
[60], [37] and the so-called gamma frailty model, in which the
unobserved effects are assumed to be gamma distributed, is
probably the most popular choice. Various frailty distributions
are presented in [37] and the references therein such as the
gamma, inverse Gaussian, log-normal or the positive stable
frailty. Other distributions include the power variance frailty
[60] and the threshold frailty [35].
Extensive research has been carried out on frailty distri-
butions, as cited above, and it is well known that, generally,
such distributions are primarily used by mathematical con-
venience. Furthermore, in general, such distributions do not
encompass a range of possible features including skewness and
multimodality. Furthermore, because the frailty variable is an
unobservable quantity, it cannot be tested to verify whether
or not it satisfies the distributional assumption [61]. It is
known that the misspecification of this distribution can lead to
several types of errors, including, for example, poor parameter
estimates [38]. A more flexible and robust approach would be
to estimate such a density using the nonparametric Bayesian
methodology. In this work, this solution will be explored.
Finally, a suitable choice of the distribution of unobserved
effects can provide interesting general results, but generally
the main quantity of interest is the variance of the unobserved
effects. Usually, a significant variance may indicate high
dependence [36], [24].
H. Shared frailty
In order to emphasize the subject matter of the repairable
systems under dependent competing risks, we introduce the
shared frailty model using the multivariate counting processes
framework based on cause-specific intensity functions.
The referred dependency between competing risks may be
modeled through a frailty variable, say Z, in such a way that,
when the frailty is shared among several units in a cluster,
it leads to dependence among the event times of the units
[36], [58], [37]. Suppose that m clusters (or systems) are
under observation, where each cluster is composed by K units
(or components). The intensity function of the j-th cluster
(j = 1, . . . ,m) of a shared frailty model is that of the Cox
model multiplied by a frailty term Zj (multiplicative random
effect model). More specifically, for each individual counting
process, {Nj(t) : t ≥ 0}, their intensity function, conditionally
on the frailty Zj , is given by
λj(t | Zj) = Zjλ(t), (14)
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where λ(t) is the basic intensity function and j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The intensity function (14) describes the recurrent failure
process on the j-th cluster and the intensity associated to the
q-th component from the j-th cluster is defined as
λjq(t | Zj) = Zjλq(t), (15)
where λq(t) is the basic intensity function from the q-th com-
ponent (cause-specific intensity function), q = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
Note that intensities (14) and (15) follow the relation λ(t) =∑K
q=1 λq(t) [15]. Henceforth, we will omit the subscript j
from λjq in (15) since we are assuming that the systems are
identical, therefore λq(t | Zj) = Zjλ′q(t). Note also that λ
′
q(t)
is referred to as the (basic) intensity function for type q events
(e.g., PLP). Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zm) denote the vector of Zjs,
which we assume arises from density fZ(·), where each Zj is
iid. These are typically parametrized so that both E(Z) and
V ar(Z) are finite, for j = 1, 2, ...,m. It is worth pointing out
that the Zjs are assumed to be stochastically independent of
the failure process λ
′
q(t) [15], [24].
The term of frailty in (14) aims to control the unobserved
heterogeneity among systems. If we consider the situation
where the dataset is divided into clusters (multiple units in
a cluster), this term evaluates the dependence between the
units that share the frailty Zj . Thus, units from heterogeneous
populations can be considered independent and homogeneous,
conditionally to the terms of frailty (Zjs) attributed to the units
or cluster of units.
The evaluation of the influence of unobserved heterogeneity
in this type of data is made on the basis of the variability of
the frailty distribution. In addition, it is worth pointing out that
higher values of V ar(Z) mean greater heterogeneity among
units and more dependence between the event times for the
same unit. In general, in the literature, it is common to specify
a distribution for the frailty variable with mean 1 and variance,
say V ar(Z) = η, in order to obtain two main advantages:
(1) the model parameters become identifiable, and (2) it is
possible to obtain an easily understandable interpretation of the
model, because, as previously argued, η acts as a dependence
parameter, meaning that, if the frailty variance is zero, it
implies that we have independence between the event times in
the clusters (since it is assumed that the mean is 1).
We emphasize here that the main focus of SECtion of the
present work will be to analyze data from multiple repairable
systems under the presence of dependent competing risks.
Thus, to estimate the model parameters considering shared
frailty. In this sense, naturally, we can consider the dependence
between the components as a nuisance parameter via frailty.
III. THE MODEL
As mentioned before, the nonparametric frailty distribution
takes into account a flexible class of distributions. In particular,
we used the DPM model to describe the frailty distribution
due to its flexibility in modeling unknown distributions. Many
approaches on nonparametric Bayesian models have been
explored in the literature related to reliability, for instance, [62]
give a comprehensive theoretical exposition on Bayesian non-
parametric estimation for survival functions arising from ob-
served failures of a competing risks model (or a series system).
[63] provide a flexible Bayesian nonparametric framework to
modeling recurrent events in a repairable system to test the
minimal repair assumption. Bayesian nonparametric inference
for NHPPs is considered by [64], who employed several
classes of nonparametric priors. As mentioned above, the idea
of our approach is to apply a Bayesian nonparametric prior
(i.e., DPM prior) to modeling uncertainty in the distribution
of shared frailty. Although this model has infinite parameters,
due to the infinite mixture model, it is a flexible mixture,
parsimonious and simple to sample. We chose the stick-
breaking representation of the DP prior [65], because of a
simple implementation to build the algorithm. To obtain the
posterior distribution, we created a hybrid MCMC algorithm
[66], using the Gibbs sampler [67] and the HMC method [68].
It is important to point out that no studies have been found
which explore the use of DPM for frailty density in the context
of multiple repairable systems under the action of dependent
competing risks.
This research highlights the importance of modeling the
dependence structure among competing causes of failure by
using a more flexible distribution for unknown frailty density
in order to provide good estimates of the model parameters.
As stated before, our primary inference goal is to estimate
PLP parameters. To this end, firstly, we model the dependence
effect with shared frailty, and secondly, we consider the frailty
distribution nonparametrically using a DPM. Regarding frailty,
the advantage is that one obtains more flexibility at the
level of density estimation and providing insights in terms of
heterogeneity among systems.
A. Multiple repairable systems subject to multiple causes of
failure
Here, we highlight the used notations in the multivariate
counting process context. Hereafter, random variables are de-
noted by capital letters (e.g., Zj , Njq), while their realizations
are denoted by the lowercase (e.g., zj , njq).
Consider a sample of m identical systems in which each
system is under the action of K different types of recurrent
causes of failure. Let Njq(t) =
∑nj
i=1 I(δji = q) be the
cumulative number of type q failures occurring over the
interval [0, t] for the j-th system (j = 1, . . . ,m; q = 1, . . . ,K
and i = 1, 2, . . . , nj), where {Njq(t) : t ≥ 0} is a counting
process. Note that Nj•(t) =
∑K
q=1Njq(t) represents the
cumulative number of failures of system j taking into account
all failures arising from all components from the j-th system.
Let N•q(t) =
∑m
j=1Njq(t) denote the number of failures of
cause q for all systems.
Suppose that each system is under observation for all types
of events over the same period of time, i.e., [0, T ]. Thus, let
tji, i = 1, 2, . . . , nj , be the observed failure times for system
j, satisfying 0 < tj1 < tj2 < · · · < tjnj < T . Besides,
denote that δji = q is the failure mode (or component) that
caused the system failure. Hence, the observed data is Dj =
{(tji, δji = q), i = 1, 2, . . . , nj ; q = 1, . . . ,K}. The complete
data is given by D = (D1, . . . , Dm).
As mentioned earlier, our focus is mainly on the component
level failure process which conforms to a PLP, therefore the
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cause-specific intensity function that governs the counting pro-
cess N•q(T ), taking into account a orthogonal parametrization
in terms of αq and βq , is defined as
λq(t) = βqαqt
βq−1T−βq , q = 1, . . . ,K, (16)
where αq is the mean function given by
αq = E [N•q(T )] = Λq(T ) =
∫ T
0
λq(s)ds. (17)
B. The shared frailty model for the PLP
It is worth pointing out that the main quantity of interest in
the shared frailty methodology adopted here is the variance of
the frailty (although it is considered as a nuisance parameter,
because our major interest is to estimate the PLP parameters).
This parameter should be estimated using information of
multiple systems. [25] state that in the single system setting
there are limitations. Therefore, our approach requires multiple
systems as presented so far.
We specify the model (15) in terms of (16) in order to
present the likelihood function with a special form. To achieve
this purpose, suppose a minimal repair is undertaken at each
failure, thus the NHPP is the model of choice. Specifically,
the failures from each component follow an NHPP, with
PLP intensity function given in (16). Furthermore, let us
consider that a realization zj ∼ fZ acts on all the cause-
specific intensities (15) belonging to the j-th system. Thus,
conditioning on the frailty term, the model is expressed as
λq(t|Zj) = Zjβqαqtβq−1ji T−βq (18)
and the mean function is given by
Λq(T |Zj) = Zjαq. (19)
It is important to point out that, hereafter, our analysis relies
on the constraint Z¯ = 1m
∑m
j=1 Zj = 1.
C. Likelihood function
To simplify notation in this section, we will drop the
subscript • and refer to nj• and n•q as nj and nq , respectively.
The likelihood contribution from the j-th system based on (18)
is given by
Lj(θ, Zj |Dj) =
[
nj∏
i=1
K∏
q=1
[λq(tji|Zj)]I(δji=q)
]
× exp
[
−
K∑
q=1
Λq(T |Zj)
]
,
(20)
where I(δji = q) represents the indicator function afore-
mentioned and θ = (β,α) with β = (β1, . . . , βK) and
α = (α1, . . . , αK); for i = 1, . . . , nj ; j = 1, . . . ,m
and q = 1, . . . ,K. Thus, the overall likelihood function is
represented by
L(θ,Z |D) =
m∏
j=1
Lj(θ, Zj |Dj)
= c
m∏
j=1
Z
nj
j
K∏
q=1
[
βnjqq α
njqβq
q T
−njqβq
njq∏
i=1
(
t
βq
ji
)]
× exp
[
−Zj
K∑
q=1
αq
]
∝
m∏
j=1
Z
nj
j
K∏
q=1
γ(βq | nq + 1, nqβˆ−1q )
× γ(αq | nq + 1,m),
(21)
where nj =
∑K
q=1 njq; nq =
∑m
j=1 njq; njq =
∑nj
i=1 I(δji =
q);
∏njq
i=1(·) =
∏nj
i=1(·)I(δji=q); c =
∏m
j=1
∏njq
i=1 t
−1
ji . In
addition,
βˆq = nq/
m∑
j=1
njq∑
i=1
log(T/tji) (22)
is the MLE for βq .
As indicated previously, the overall likelihood function (21)
may be factored as a product of three quantities, as follows:
L(θ,Z |D) = L1(Z | D)L2(β | D)L3(α | D), (23)
where L1(Z | D) =
∏m
j=1 Z
nj
j ; L2(β | D) =
∏k
q=1 γ(βq |
nq + 1, nqβˆq
−1
) and L3(α | D) =
∏k
q=1 γ(αq | nq + 1,m)
and it will be used later in our posterior analysis.
IV. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
This section, in turn, is divided into two parts. In the
first, we present the choice of the prior distributions for βq
and αq (q = 1, . . . , k) in the PLP model. In this case, we
consider a similar approach according to the study of [9]. In
the second, we discuss a Bayesian nonparametric approach to
model the uncertainty about the distribution of shared frailty.
As we will see in this section, we can carry out an individual
posterior analysis of the quantities of interest due to the
orthogonality among αq and βq and the assumption that Zjs
are stochastically independent of the failure processes λqs.
A. Prior specification for α and β
Selecting an adequate prior distribution using formal rules
has been widely discussed in the literature [69]. In the re-
pairable systems context, [9] considered the following class
of prior for the PLP model
pi(α, β) ∝ α−1β−ζ , (24)
where ζ > 0 is a known hyperparameter. Following these
authors, we apply their main results in the setting of repairable
systems under competing risks using the particular parametric
formulation of PLP (18). Thus, we propose the prior distribu-
tion for the referred context as follows:
pi(α, β) ∝
K∏
q=1
α−1q β
−ζ
q . (25)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 00, NO. 0, NOVEMBER 2019 8
This class of prior distributions includes the invariant Jef-
freys’ prior when ζ = 1. Moreover, it reduces to (24) when
q = 1. Further, we will discuss the chosen value for ζ, and
necessary conditions for the obtained posterior to be proper.
Note that, due to (23) and the assumption that Zjs are
stochastically independent of the failure processes λqs, the
joint posterior distribution of (25) is proper. Note also that,
the marginal distributions pi(β | D) and pi(α | D) are proper
since they are independent, as follows:
pi(β | D) =
k∏
q=1
γ
(
βq | nq + 1− ζ, nqβˆ−1q
)
(26)
and
pi(α | D) =
k∏
q=1
γ(αq | nq,m). (27)
Since pi(α | D) is the product of independent gamma
distributions, then the marginal joint distribution pi(α | D)
is proper. Using the same idea, pi(β | D) is the product of
independent gamma distributions if nq > ζ and, therefore, is
a proper marginal posterior distribution.
This work adopts the quadratic loss function, hence the
Bayes estimator is the posterior mean which has optimality
under Kullback-Leibler divergence. It is worth pointing out
that, in this chapter, the notation adopted for posterior mean
will be αˆBayesq and βˆ
Bayes
q . Therefore,
αˆBayesq = E(αq | D) =
nq
m
βˆBayesq = E(βq | D) =
(nq + 1− ζ)
nq
βˆq. (28)
Besides the good properties mentioned above, we have that
E
[
αˆBayesq
]
= αq and
E
[
βˆBayesq
]
= E
[
(nq + 1− ζ)
nq
βˆq
]
= βq if ζ = 2.
(29)
Therefore, assuming that ζ = 2 we have that both αˆBayesq
and βˆBayesq are unbiased estimators for αq and βq .
B. Bayesian nonparametric approach for frailty distribution
This work presents the frailty distribution as an unknown
distribution, therefore we will apply the Bayesian nonparamet-
ric methodology. Traditionally, the key idea of the Bayesian
nonparametric approach is to obtain inference on an unknown
distribution function using process priors on the spaces of
densities. According to a definition provided by [65], the non-
parametric Bayesian model involves infinitely many parame-
ters. To better understand the technical definition of Bayesian
nonparametric models in a broad way, please see [70], [71], for
example. There are many methods that specify more flexible
density such as finite mixtures, DP, DPM, and mixture of Polya
trees. Here, we considered DPM for logarithm of the frailty
W = log(Z), represented by
W1, . . . ,Wm ∼ F
F ∼ D(c, F0), (30)
where D is the DP prior with base distribution F0; c is the
concentration parameter and W = (W1, . . . ,Wm)′. c can also
be interpreted as a precision parameter that indicates how close
the F distribution is to the base distribution F0 [72].
Using the stick-breaking representation discussed in [65], a
DPM of Gaussian distribution can be represented as infinite
mixtures of Gaussian, which is an extension of the finite
mixture model. Therefore, a density function of W can be
represented by
fW (W ) = fW (W | Ω) =
∞∑
l=1
ρlN (w | µl, τ−1l ), (31)
where N (· | µ, τ−1) denotes a normal density function
with parameters (µ, τ−1); Ω = {ρ,µ, τ} is the infinite-
dimensional parameter vector describing the mixture distri-
bution for W ; ρ = {ρl}∞l=1 represents the vector of weights,
µ = {µl}∞l=1 is the vector of means and τ = {τl}∞l=1 is the
vector of precision, for l = 1, 2, . . . . Note that the density
function of Z can be calculated as follows:
fZ(Z) = fZ(Z | Ω) =
∞∑
l=1
ρlLN (z | µl, τ−1l ), (32)
where LN (· | µ, τ−1) denotes log-normal density functions
with parameters µ and τ−1. Therefore, Z can be represented as
the infinite mixture log-normal. Note that the base distributions
of Z and W are a log-normal and a normal distribution,
respectively.
Prior specification for Ω : As shown before, Ω represents a
collection of all unknown parameters in (31) and (32). Based
on this, we specified a prior distribution for Ω as follows.
Firstly, we specify a prior for ρ.
Using the stick-breaking representation for prior distribution
of ρ, denoted by pi(ρ), parameter vector ρ is reparameterized
as follows:
ρ1 = ν1,
ρl =
l−1∏
o=1
(1− νo)νl, ∀ o = 2, 3, . . . , (33)
where the prior distribution of the vector ν = {νl}∞l=1 is
independent and identically distributed with beta distribution
denoted by
ν ∼ B(1, c), (34)
and the hyper-prior distribution of c is
pi(c) ∼ G(ac0, bc0), (35)
where G(·, ·) represents the gamma distribution [72]. Be-
sides, we chose a normal-gamma distribution as the prior of
(µl, τl) ∼ NG(m0, s0, d0p0, d0), for l = 1, 2, . . ., due to the
fact that this prior is conjugate to the normal distribution,
where
µl | τl ∼ N (m0, (s0τl)−1) ,
τl ∼ G(d0, d0p0) .
Thus, joint prior density of Ω can be expressed as
pi(Ω) = pi(c)pi(ρ)pi(µ, τ ). (36)
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For our Bayesian estimation scheme, the joint posterior
distribution of Z and all the unknown parameters in Ω are
reached by joining all the prior information (32), (36) and the
likelihood function (23), as follows:
pi(Z,Ω | D) ∝ L1(Z|D)fZ(Z | Ω)pi(Ω). (37)
However, it is easy to see that (37) does not have a closed
form. Besides, the marginal posterior of Z is intractable and
it is therefore necessary to use MCMC algorithms, as we will
see next. Recalling that one of our primary goals is to estimate
Zjs, thus, the Bayes estimator of Z is given by
Zˆ
Bayes
=
L∑
i=1
Z(i)
L
, (38)
where Z(i) is the i-th iteration and L is the total number of
iterations of the MCMC chain.
MCMC algorithm
This section describes an MCMC algorithm to sample from
the posterior distribution of Z. Our algorithm is based on [66],
and its main characteristic is to estimate infinite parameters
by introducing latent variables. We introduce a finite set of
latent variables with uniform distribution with parameters 0
and 1, denoted by U ∼ Uniform[0, 1]. Therefore, applying the
variable U in (32) follows the joint density of (Z,U)
fZ,U (z, u | Ω) =
∞∑
l=1
LN (z | µl, τ−1l )I(u < ρl), (39)
where I(·) is an indicator function. Note that there is a finite
number of elements in ρ which are greater than u, denoted as
Aρ(u) = {j : ρj > u}. Therefore, the representation in (39)
is similar to
fZ,U (z, u | Ω) =
∑
l∈Aρ
LN (z | µl, τ−1l ), (40)
so that, given U, the number of mixture components is finite
for Z.
In order to simplify the likelihood, we introduce a new dis-
crete latent variable Y which indicates the mixture component
that Z comes from
fZ,U,Y (z, u, Y = l | Ω) = LN (z | µl, τ−1l )I(l ∈ Aρ(u)).
(41)
Note that Pr(Y = l | Ω) = ρl, ∀l = 1, 2, . . ., therefore the
conditional distribution of Z | U, Y = l is log-normal with
parameters µl and τ−1l , so W | U, Y = l ∼ N (µl, τ−1l ).
Hence, the complete posterior distribution of Z,Ω with the
latent variables U and Y is given by
pi(Z,Ω,U,Y | D) ∝ L1(Z|D)fZ,U,Y (Z | Ω,U ,Y )fU (U)
× Pr(Y | Ω)pi(Ω),
(42)
where U = {Uj}mj=1 and Y = {Yj}mj=1 are latent variables.
Hybrid MCMC - computational strategy: Using the latent
variables presented above, we now construct the following
MCMC algorithm which is a combination of the Gibbs sam-
pler with the HMC method. For more details on the HMC
method, see [68]. We chose the HMC algorithm because it
generates samples with less dependence with a high probabil-
ity of acceptance between state if compared with the Random
Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The Gibbs algorithm
requires knowledge of complete conditional distributions in
order to be able to sample from them. For further details, see
[66] and [72]. The complete conditional distributions are listed
below.
1. Conditional Distribution of c
[72] shows that given Y, the parameter is independent of
all other parameters and the conditional distribution of c
is given by
pi(c | Y) ∝ (c+m)cy∗−1G (c | ac0, bc0)B(c+ 1,m)
× I(c > 0),
(43)
where y∗ = max(Y) and B(·, ·) is the Beta function.
Using the definition of the Beta function we can create an
auxiliary variable ξ with the joint distribution for which
the marginal distribution is (43) and is given by
pi(c, ξ | Y) ∝ (c+m)cy∗−1ξG (c | ac0, bc0)
× ξc (1− ξ)m−1 I(c > 0)I(0 < ξ < 1).
(44)
Hence, it follows that the conditional posteriors of ξ and
c are given by
ξ | c,Y ∼ B(c+ 1,m) (45)
and
c | ξ,Y ∼ pξG(a∗1, b∗1) + (1− pξ)G(a∗2, b∗1), (46)
where a∗1 = a0 + y
∗, a∗2 = a
∗
1 + 1, b
∗
1 = b0 − log(ξ)
and pξ = (a0 + y∗ − 1)/(a0 + z∗ − 1 + m(b0 − log(ξ).
Therefore, c can be sampled using the auxiliary ξ with
equations (45) and (46).
2. Conditional Distribution of ν
Note that by equations (41) and (42), ν depends on Y, U
and c, therefore the conditional distribution of ν is
νl | Y,U, c ∼ B(nl + 1,m+
∑l
o=1 no + c) ,∀l = 1, . . . , y∗B(1, c) ,∀l = y∗ + 1,
y∗ + 2, . . . ,
(47)
where nl is the number of observations in the l-th
component. It is worth noting that in order to sample
ρ it is enough to simulate ν calculated by equation (33).
3. Conditional Distribution of U
The latent variable U depends only on ρ, and the condi-
tional distribution of U is
Uj | ρ ∼ Uniform[0, ρj ] ∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (48)
4. Conditional Distribution of µ and τ
The µ and τ parameters of each component are inde-
pendent and adding the fact that the Normal-Gamma is
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conjugated from the Normal distribution, the conditional
distribution of µ and τ is given by
µl, τl | Y ∼
{ NG(ml, sl, dlpl, dl) , ∀l = 1, . . . , y∗
NG(m0, s0, d0p0, d0) , ∀l = y∗ + 1, y∗ + 2, . . . ,
(49)
where
ml =
s0m0 + nlw¯
s0 + nl
,
sl = s0 + nl ,
dlpl = d0p0 +
∑
j:yj=l
(wj − w¯)2 + s0nl
s0 + nl
(m0 − w¯)2 ,
dl = d0 + nl ,
w¯ =
∑
j:yj=l
wj
nl
.
5. Conditional Distribution of Y
The latent variable Y is discrete, therefore using equations
(41) and (42) the conditional distribution of Y is
Pr(Yj = l | Ω,W,U,D) ∝ N (w | µl, τ−1l )I(l ∈ Aρ).
(50)
6. Conditional Distribution of Z
The conditional distribution of Z is given by
pi(Z | Ω,U ,Y ,D) ∝
m∏
j=1
LN (zj | µYj , τ−1Yj )L1(Z|D),
(51)
with restriction Z¯ = 1. Different from the previous
parameters and latent variable, we simulate them using
the HMC algorithm. However, the HMC algorithm re-
quires that the support random variable is unrestricted.
Therefore, we transform the variable Z to a variable with
unrestricted support as explained below.
Let Z∗ be a random vector with m − 1 elements and
unrestricted support. We define the following variables:
Bj = logit−1(Z∗j − log(m− j)),
Aj =
1− j−1∑
j′=1
Aj′
BJ ∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1,
Am = 1−
m−1∑
j′=1
Aj′ , (52)
where logit−1 is an inverse function of logit. Note that
the functions of transformed variables are bijection, Bj ∈
(0, 1) and sum(A) = 1. Naturally, we assume that Z =
mA. Therefore, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is
given by,
| J(z∗) |=
m−1∏
j=1
bj(1− bj)
1− j−1∑
j′=1
aj′
 .
Therefore, the conditional distribution of Z∗ is given by
pi(Z∗ | Ω,U ,Y ,D) ∝| J(z∗) | LN (zj | µYj , τ−1Yj )
× L1(Z|D).
(53)
Thus, we constructed a Hybrid MCMC algorithm that
combines Gibbs sampling with HMC sampling to sample Z
and Ω; see algorithm below.
1: Initialize c(0), Z∗(0) and Y(0).
2: Calculate Z(0) of Equation (52) and W(0) = log(Z(0)).
3: Draw ξ(i) from pi(ξ | c(i−1),Y(i−1)) of Equation (45).
4: Draw c(i) from pi(c | ξ(i),Y(i−1)) of Equation (46).
5: Draw ν(i)l from pi(νl | Y(i−1), c(i)) of Equation (47),
∀l = 1, 2, . . . , y∗.
6: Calculate ρ(i)l of Equation (33) ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , y∗.
7: Draw U (i)j from pi(Uj | ρ(i)) of Equation (48) ∀j =
1, 2, . . . ,m.
8: Find the smallest l∗ such that
∑l∗
l=1 ρl > (1−min(U(i)))
and draw ν(i)l from pi(νl | Y(i−1), c(i)) , ∀l = y∗ +
1, . . . , l∗.
9: Draw µ(i)l and τ
(i)
l from pi(µl, τl | Y(i−1)) of Equation
(49) ∀l = 1, 2, . . . , l∗.
10: Draw Y (i)j from Pr(Yj | µ(i), τ (i),W(i−1),U(i),D) of
Equation (50) ∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
11: Draw Z∗(i) from pi(Z∗ | µ(i), τ (i),U (i),Y (i)) of Equa-
tion (53).
12: Calculate Z(i) of Equation (52) and W(i) = log(Z(i)).
13: Set i = i+ 1 and go to Step #3.
In this scheme, the HMC sampler is applied in Step #11.
The algorithm was developed in the C++ language using
the RccpArmadilho library [73]. Its main advantages are
processing speed and interaction with the R program [74]. This
code was used both in the generation of posterior sampling and
in the simulation study presented in the following section.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, a simulation study is performed to evaluate
the efficiency of the Bayesian estimators via the Monte Carlo
method. To make our presentation easier, we consider two
causes of failure with distinct parameters for each cause θ =
(β1, α1, β2, α2). The proposed simulation design is consistent
with the following setup: (i) there are m = (10, 50, 100)
systems, each observed on the fixed time interval from (0, 20];
(ii) the failure process for each component follows a power-
law NHPPs with intensity (18); (iii) among the many possible
parameter choices, we provide details for (β1 = 1.2, α1 =
5, β2 = 0.7, α2 = 13.33) and (β1 = 0.75, α1 = 9.46, β2 =
1.25, α2 = 12.69); and (iv) we generate each random obser-
vation zj , j = 1, . . . ,m, iid with mean one and variance η,
according to a gamma distribution. In addition, we consider a
set of values for variance of Z, η = (0.5, 1, 5), indicating low,
middle and high dependence degrees, respectively. For each
setup of parameters, we obtain the mean number of failures (5,
13.3), (9.5, 12.7), respectively. In the first simulated scenario,
the mean number of failures of one of the components is
predominant over the other component. In the last scenario, the
mean number of failures of each component are almost equal
to each other. It is worth noting that the obtained results are
similar for other parameter combinations and can be extended
to more causes, i.e. p > 2. Using the fact that the causes are
dependent due to frailty term Zj and also using the known
results from the literature about NHPPs [2], in each Monte
Carlo replication the failure times and indicators of the cause
of failure were generated as shown in the following algorithm.
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1: Generate iid zj ∼ γ(η, 1/η) for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, with
mean one and variance η.
2: For each cause of failure, generate random numbers nj1
and nj2, j = 1, . . . ,m, both from a Poisson distribution
with mean zjαq , for q = 1, 2, respectively.
3: For the q-th cause of failure from j-th system, let
the failure times be tj,1,q, . . . , tj,nj ,q , where tj,i,q =
T U
1/βjq
j,i,q and Uj,1,q, . . . , Uj,nj ,q are the order statistics
of a size nj random sample from the standard uniform
distribution.
4: Finally, to obtain the data in the form (ti, δi), let the tis
be the set of ordered failure times and set δi equal to j
according to the corresponding cause of failure (i.e., set
δi = 1 if ti = th,1 for some h or δi = j depending on
the cause of failure).
Software R was used to implement this simulation study
[74]. We considered two criteria to evaluate the estimators’
behaviour: the Bias, given by Biasθˆi =
∑M
j=1(θˆi,j − θi)/M
and the MSE, given by MSEθˆi =
∑M
j=1 (θˆi,j − θi)2/M,
where M is the number of estimates (i.e. the Monte Carlo
size), where we take M = 50, 000 throughout the section,
and θ = (θ1, . . . , θp) is the vector of parameters. Additionally,
we computed the CP95%. Good estimators should have Bias,
MSE close to zero and adequate intervals should be short while
showing CP95% close to 0.95. The Bias and MSE are widely
used to measure the performance evaluation.
The Bayes estimators for βj and αj were obtained using
independent marginal posteriors according to gamma distribu-
tions given in (26). Since the marginal posterior distributions
for the parameters βj and αj follow gamma distributions, we
can obtain closed-form expressions for the posterior means
and obtain the credibility intervals based on the 2.5% and
97.5% percentile posteriors. Hence, no MCMC was needed
to obtain the estimates for these parameters. On the other
hand, to obtain the estimates of the Zjs, j = 1, . . . ,m, we
considered the HMC described in Section IV-B. For each
simulated data set, 10, 000 iterations were performed using the
MCMC methods. As a burn-in, the first 5, 000 initial values
were discarded. The Geweke criterion [75] was considered to
check the convergence of the obtained chains under a 95%
confidence level. In addition, trace and autocorrelation plots
of the generated sampled values of each Zj showed that they
converged to the target distribution. The remaining 5, 000
were used for posterior inference. Specifically, these values
were used to compute the posterior means of Zjs. Table I
presents the Bias, the MSE and coverage probability with a
95% confidence level of the Bayes estimates for α1, α2, β1, β2
and the variance of Z.
As shown in Tables I and II, the biases of the Bayes
estimator are very close to zero for all the parameters, while
both Bias and MSE tend to zero as m increases. Hence,
in terms of Bias and MSE, the Bayes estimators provided
accurate inferences for the parameters of the PLP model. In
terms of coverage probabilities, we observed that using our
Bayes estimators returned accurate credibility intervals even
for a small number of system m. This result may be explained
by the fact that our proposed Bayes estimators do not depend
on asymptotic results to obtain the credibility intervals, which
leads to accurate results for small sample sizes.
VI. APPLICATION TO THE WARRANTY REPAIR DATA
The dataset considered in this section comprises the re-
current failure history of a fleet of identical automobiles
obtained from a warranty claim database presented in [24].
For the sake of clarity, our graphics present only the cars that
presented failures in the observation period. Figure 3 shows
the recurrence of failures of the 172 cars according to the
cause of failure and the car mileage at each failure. The x-
axis indicates the mileage. It is worth noting that the process
of data collection has truncated time, where the observation
period is 3000 miles for all cars. Each car from the fleet is
represented by a horizontal line, where the cause of failure 1
is identified by the green circle, the cause of failure 2 by the
red triangle and the cause of failure 3 by the blue square. We
suppose that maintenance policy is minimal repair.
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Fig. 3. Recurrences of three causes of failure for 172 cars from warranty
claims data. The green circle represents the cause of failure 1, the red triangle
represents the cause of failure 2 and the blue square represents the cause of
failure 3.
The main authors make only a table available (omitted here)
containing the mileage to repeated failures of 172 vehicles,
as well as the associated cause of failure. There were 76
failures related to the cause of failure 1, 87 related to the
cause of failure 2 and 111 related to the cause of failure 3.
They also pointed out that there were 267 cars that did not fail
during the observation period. However, following the correct
methodology, we consider 439 automobiles in our analysis.
Following [24], [25], we assessed the adequacy of the PLP
for each cause of failure using the Duane plot [76], [77],
[2]. Figure 4 shows plots of logarithm of the number of
failures Nq(t) (for q = 1, 2, 3) against the logarithm of the
accumulated mileage at failure. Since the three plots exhibit
reasonable linearity, the PLP model seems to be adequate.
Since the PLP is adequate we consider our proposed
approach to fit the data. As presented in Section ??, we
assume the prior distribution (25) for parameters αq and
βq (q = 1, 2, 3) and, consequently, the marginal posterior
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TABLE I
THE BIAS, MSE, CP(95%) FROM THE ESTIMATES CONSIDERING DIFFERENT VALUES FOR VARIANCE OF Z AND NUMBER OF SYSTEMS (m) WITH
SCENARIO θ=(1.2, 5, 0.7, 13.3).
η Parameter m α1 α2 β1 β2 η
10 -0.0041 0.0083 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0784
Bias 50 0.0011 -0.0055 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0276
100 -0.0001 0.0074 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0165
10 0.7035 1.1696 0.0729 0.0882 0.2709
0.5 MSE 50 0.3182 0.5093 0.0321 0.0390 0.1359
100 0.2230 0.3650 0.0225 0.0276 0.0957
10 0.9427 0.9443 0.9449 0.9501 0.8395
CP(95%) 50 0.9483 0.9500 0.9459 0.9506 0.9366
100 0.9502 0.9496 0.9512 0.9488 0.9444
10 0.0084 -0.0105 0.0003 -0.0023 0.0307
Bias 50 0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0253
100 0.0010 0.0039 0.0000 0.0000 0.0158
10 0.6996 1.1449 0.0735 0.0879 0.5395
1 MSE 50 0.3120 0.5185 0.0316 0.0393 0.2891
100 0.2231 0.3690 0.0226 0.0275 0.2015
10 0.9444 0.9517 0.9432 0.9477 0.9423
CP(95%) 50 0.9532 0.9488 0.9477 0.9477 0.9544
100 0.9477 0.9472 0.9489 0.9492 0.9478
10 0.0174 -0.0120 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.1693
Bias 50 -0.0017 -0.0085 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0453
100 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0425
10 0.7156 1.1508 0.0723 0.0873 2.2234
5 MSE 50 0.3179 0.5141 0.0317 0.0390 2.1358
100 0.2239 0.3711 0.0223 0.0276 1.5038
10 0.9419 0.9508 0.9460 0.9483 0.9340
CP(95%) 50 0.9476 0.9504 0.9500 0.9472 0.9473
100 0.9470 0.9462 0.9505 0.9476 0.9426
TABLE II
THE BIAS, MSE, CP(95%) FROM THE ESTIMATES CONSIDERING DIFFERENT VALUES FOR VARIANCE OF Z AND NUMBER OF SYSTEMS (m) WITH
SCENARIO θ=(0.75, 9.5, 1.25, 12.7)
η Parameter m α1 α2 β1 β2 η
10 0.0215 -0.0189 0.0004 0.0000 0.0745
Bias 50 0.0017 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0218
100 0.0025 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 0.0155
10 0.9632 1.1248 0.0787 0.1120 0.2691
0.5 MSE 50 0.4341 0.4992 0.0347 0.0495 0.1312
100 0.3085 0.3569 0.0243 0.0350 0.0946
10 0.9498 0.9477 0.9467 0.9470 0.8346
CP(95%) 50 0.9506 0.9516 0.9497 0.9508 0.9377
100 0.9471 0.9462 0.9509 0.9482 0.9417
10 -0.0025 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0003 0.0233
Bias 50 0.0005 0.0039 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0155
100 0.0024 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0087
10 0.9678 1.1311 0.0780 0.1138 0.5279
1 MSE 50 0.4340 0.5065 0.0346 0.0497 0.2808
100 0.3087 0.3592 0.0246 0.0355 0.1987
10 0.9497 0.9503 0.9478 0.9471 0.9407
CP(95%) 50 0.9495 0.9465 0.9477 0.9515 0.9510
100 0.9456 0.9470 0.9463 0.9482 0.9495
10 -0.0148 -0.0076 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.1558
Bias 50 -0.0027 -0.0039 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0577
100 0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.1141
10 0.9663 1.1197 0.0785 0.1119 2.2178
5 MSE 50 0.4366 0.5044 0.0348 0.0497 2.0724
100 0.3075 0.3592 0.0246 0.0347 1.4197
10 0.9517 0.9512 0.9493 0.9491 0.9354
CP(95%) 50 0.9491 0.9471 0.9499 0.9522 0.9479
100 0.9489 0.9467 0.9497 0.9551 0.9485
distributions (26). On the basis of the latter consideration, the
posterior mean estimates are computed in closed-form and the
CIs are obtained directly from the gamma distribution. The
results of the analysis are presented in Table III, which show
Bayes estimates along with the corresponding SDs and CIs.
According to these data, the estimates of the shape parameters(
βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3
)
are smaller than 1; see Table III. This clearly
indicates improvement in reliability.
The hybrid MCMC sampler algorithm presented in Section
IV-B was used to obtain a sample from the joint posterior
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Fig. 4. The plot shows a fairly linear pattern for the three causes of failure
indicating the fit according to the PLP model: cause 1 (blue circles); cause 2
(red circles) and cause 3 (black circles)
TABLE III
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR WARRANTY CLAIM DATASET
Parameter Bayes SD CI (95%)
β1 0.300 0.035 [0.236 ; 0.372]
β2 0.409 0.044 [0.327 ; 0.500]
β3 0.698 0.067 [0.574 ; 0.835]
α1 0.173 0.020 [0.136 ; 0.214]
α2 0.198 0.021 [0.159 ; 0.242]
α3 0.253 0.024 [0.208 ; 0.302]
V ar(Z) 1.755 0.438 [1.050 ; 2.777]
distribution related to the frailty distribution. The initial values
to start the sample of the chains for the DPM were random. For
the MCMC chain, we considered 10,000 iterations initially,
where the first 5,000 were discarded as burn-in samples and
the last 5,000 iterations were used to compute the posterior
estimates of V ar(Z) (at the bottom of the Table III) and
the individual values of Zjs, as presented in Figure 5. The
convergence was monitored for the Geweke test assuming
a 95% confidence level (see Figure 8 in Appendix A). For
completeness, we also present MCMC diagnostic plots, such
as traces and autocorrelations for the HMC algorithm; see
Appendix A.
It is worth pointing out that higher values of V ar(Z) signify
greater heterogeneity among systems and more dependence
between the times of the causes of failure for the same system.
Therefore, as Table III shows, the posterior mean of V ar(Z)
provides evidence of a meaningful dependence between the
times of the causes of failure within a system.
A. Insights on the unobserved heterogeneity
As shown in Table III, the estimate of V ar(Z) shows that
there is strong posterior evidence of a meaningful degree
of heterogeneity in the population of systems. Table IV
(Appendix A) shows the estimated posterior means and the
corresponding standard deviations of the zˆjs.
Figure 5 shows the individual frailty estimates (posterior
means) of zˆj , j = 1, . . . , 172. As mentioned earlier, each Zj
acts in a multiplicative way in the specific-cause intensities.
Thus it follows that values of Zj equal to or very close to 1 (red
line) do not significantly affect such intensities. On the other
hand, values larger than 1 indicate increased intensity. It is
apparent that some cars have values of Zj greater than 2. These
cars are probably subject to environmental stress variations or
other unobserved issues, which make them more vulnerable
than those with Zj values closer to or less than 1.
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z^ j
Fig. 5. The individual frailty estimates, zˆj ’s. The red line highlights value 1
in the y-axis.
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Fig. 6. Estimated frailty versus mileage observed at failure for each car in
automobile warranty data. The red line highlights value 1 in the y-axis. The
reasoning is that cars that are more frail failed earlier than ones that are less
frail.
Figure 6 indicates that the estimated frailties are overall
larger for cars that had a failure early than those who had a
failure later. We also note that a system with a large value
of zˆj experienced more failures than a system with a smaller
value of zˆj (see Figure 7).
0
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0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
Cumulative number of failures by car
z^ j
Fig. 7. Scatterplot of individual estimates zˆj against cumulative number of
failures by car. Note that systems with a large value of zˆj experienced more
failures than a system with a smaller value of zˆj .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY, VOL. 00, NO. 0, NOVEMBER 2019 14
These outcomes indicate that neglecting these effects can
result in an underestimation of the parameters. Overall, the
multiplicative shared frailty model is appropriate for modeling
this effect accurately.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proposed a new approach to analyzing
multiple repairable systems data under the action of dependent
competing risks. We have shown how to model the frailty-
induced dependence nonparametrically using a DPM which
does not make restrictive assumptions about the density of
the frailty variable. Although some research has been carried
out on nonparametric frailty in the reliability field [44], [45],
to the best of our knowledge, the proposed approach is the
first for this competing risks setup. The main focus of this
chapter was to provide estimates for the PLP model taking into
account the dependence effect among component failures of
the system. Such a dependence effect influences the statistical
inferences of the model parameters, thus the misspecification
of the frailty distribution may lead to errors when estimating
the quantities of interest.
An orthogonal parametrization for the cause-specific in-
tensity PLP parameters was presented, which allowed us to
consider a generalized version of [9] prior distribution for the
parameters of the model. Assuming the quadratic loss function
as the risk function, we obtained the posterior mean for the
parameters in closed-form expression. Moreover, since the
marginal posterior distributions for the PLP parameters follow
gamma distributions, we obtained the credibility intervals
directly for the quantile function. Assuming a specific value for
ζ, we obtained unbiased estimators for the cited parameters.
A simulation study was conducted to confirm our theoretical
results, as well as to measure if the variability of the frailty
distributions was correctly computed. This study returned
excellent results that confirmed that our Bayes estimators are
robust in terms of Bias, MSE and coverage probabilities.
Using nonparametric Bayesian methods with a mixture prior
distribution enabled us to increase the amount of information
beyond the parameter estimates. We considered a Bayesian
nonparametric prior to describing the frailty distribution due to
its flexibility in modeling unknown distributions. Although this
model has infinite parameters, it is a flexible mixture model,
parsimonious and straightforward to sample from. In this case,
we chose the stick-breaking representation of the DP prior
because of a simple implementation to build the algorithm.
Hence, we proposed a hybrid MCMC algorithm that comprises
a mixture of the Gibbs sampler and the HMC method, thus
generating a chain with little dependence.
The results of this investigation show that we can obtain
more precise parameter estimations by considering the high
flexibility due to nonparametric Bayesian prior density for Z.
It also enables us to obtain insights into the heterogeneity be-
tween the systems by individually estimating Zjs, as presented
in Section VI-A. The methodology proposed in this study may
be of assistance to industrial applications and also where the
interest may be in the phases of developmental programs of
prototypes with purposes to predict the reliability, for example.
Our findings can be applied in real data sets based on
the following assumptions. The proposed model requires m
identical repairable systems subjected to K competing risks
(assuming dependece). Minimal repair policy is assumed. The
recurrent data structure (failure history) should be based on
cause-specific intensity functions with PLP. The data sampling
scheme (system observational period) is the time truncated
case. Consider the shared frailty model to incorporate the
dependence among the cause-specific recurrent processes. Fi-
nally, the dataset should be structured as Table V in Appendix
C.
More flexible modeling can be further proposed by extend-
ing our approach to model the intensity function of failures
of the NHPP nonparametrically since that the PLP inten-
sity cannot capture non-monotonic behaviors. This extension
would make the model more robust and flexible. In this
case, we would have a fully nonparametric approach. The
proposed study can also be further adapted under other types
of repair such as perfect or imperfect. Our approach should
be investigated further in these contexts.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we presented estimates of some Zj’s
associated to cars 1, 17, 26, 161, 165 and 169, according
to Figure 5 (these are the estimates that presented the
highest values). For completeness, we also present here
the Geweke diagnostic test for checking the convergence
of the chains, as well as MCMC diagnostic plots, such as
trace and autocorrelations for the HMC algorithm of some Zjs.
TABLE IV
BAYESIAN ESTIMATES OF SOME ZjS WITH THEIR SD.
Zj Bayes SD
Z1 2.469 1.711
...
...
...
Z17 5.1 2.87
...
...
...
Z26 8.269 3.669
...
...
...
Z161 11.519 4.359
...
...
...
Z165 9.941 4.038
...
...
...
Z169 6.615 3.354
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Fig. 8. Geweke diagnostic test - implemented using CODA package in R
software.
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Fig. 9. Markov chain and autocorrelation plots for the HMC algorithm - Z1.
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Fig. 10. Markov chain and autocorrelation plots for the HMC algorithm -
Z17.
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Fig. 11. Markov chain and autocorrelation plots for the HMC algorithm -
Z26.
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Fig. 12. Markov chain and autocorrelation plots for the HMC algorithm -
Z161.
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Fig. 13. Markov chain and autocorrelation plots for the HMC algorithm -
Z165.
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Fig. 14. Markov chain and autocorrelation plots for the HMC algorithm -
Z169.
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TABLE V
DATA STRUCTURE - OBSERVATIONS FOR m SYSTEMS WITH K COMPETING RISKS.
System Competing Risks (δ) Failure times (tji) Number of failures (njq)
1 t11, t12, . . . , t1n11 n11
1 2 t11, t12, . . . , t1n12 n12
...
...
...
K t11, t12, . . . , t1n1K n1K
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 tm1, tm2, . . . , tmnm1 nm1
m 2 tm1, tm2, . . . , tmnm2 nm2
...
...
...
K tm1, tm2, . . . , tmnmK nmK
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